Iran Part 2 1951/1953 (A problem called Mussadeq)

Iran Part 2

At end of part one, we left the British Labour party struggling with the dilemma caused by the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company at the hands of Prime Minister Mohammed Mussadeq. Celebrations in Iran were short-lived, however, as it soon became evident that the response of the Oil Company was to go on strike. Most non Iranian staff left, the rest were fired. When the British refused to allow their tanker drivers to sign a document recognising that they were transporting Iranian oil, the oil business came to a grinding halt.

Meanwhile, the hawks in London were advocating a military response to retrieve such a valuable British asset. They predicted copycat losses occurring all over the globe if Britain failed to react. To placate these voices and buy themselves some time, the British Government sent the HMS Mauritius to evacuate all British citizens from the area. They also sent reinforcements to Iraq and Cyprus to create unease in the country.

The US was called in to support the UK but, in fact they had little sympathy with the British demands. On a visit to America, Mussadeq completely won over the Americans. While the Brits saw him as a funny little man in pyjamas, the Americans saw a charismatic believer in democracy who did not encourage the communists and was seeking freedom from the imperialistic British just as the Americans had done themselves. The fact that there was 50% of the World’s production of oil available to Iran’s supporters probably did no harm to his case at all.

To avoid what they saw as a disastrous military involvement in Iran, America sent its great negotiator of the day, Averell Harriman, to try to end the impasse. In fact Harriman and, Richard Stokes, the negotiator sent in by the Brits, both believed that the Iranians were justified in their cause. Back in London, however, a jingoistic press accompanied by the dominance of the Anglo Iranian Oil’s voice among the political elite, meant that no compromise was likely to be reached.

Up to this point, it was widely thought that Mussadeq was the only politician that could hold back the Communists in Iran. The new Conservative Government returning to power in 1951 had no such fears. Churchill, by this time, was a Prime Minister in name only and Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary and Deputy PM, was very much in control of our foreign policy. Eden knew of the successful machinations going on behind the scenes in Iran. British intelligence had been under instructions from the Labour Government to organize the fall of Mussadeq and a coup was shaping up nicely. It also seemed likely that the Communists could easily be set up to take the blame. For the moment it was best if the British played along with American negotiators to buy a little more time.

Mussadeq did himself no favours when he failed to accept an interim agreement set up by the US. This would have allowed oil to flow while keeping the money for overseas sales in the hands of trustees. His short sightedness led to the US losing patience with him and as a result he failed to secure the loan the country needed to sustain it until its oil revenue returned.

In the resulting outcry against Mussadeq in the Majlis, old political hand, Quavam Saltanah, was quick to see a window of opportunity. He had approached Julian Amery, a Tory with very high Government connections to show his willingness to support British interests in Iran. As a result, in July 1952, he momentarily found himself appointed to the position of Prime Minister, by the Shah. Mussadeq had resigned over his claim to the right to appoint War Minister. Knowing that he could rely on his ability to move the masses, Mussadeq once again addressed his people and they turned out in their masses to call for his return to power. When the army refused to fire on demonstrators, Saltanah had to be removed.

“The popular reaction to the resignation of Mussadeq in Tehran was such that Quavam could not continue. This was a real setback. I think at the same time the military takeover in Egypt was taking place. It was a bad week.” Reported Sir Donald Logan, assistant to Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office.

 Mussadeq came back with a vengeance that frightened his opponents. He forced the Shah’s sister to leave the country; cut the royal budget; named himself War Minister; and took over some of the power from the Majlis.

The time had come for British intelligence to oust Mussadeq, once and for all. Thanks to the pro-English Rashidian brothers, Seyfollah, Qodratollah and Assadollah, their plans were well underway.

The Rashidian family were very wealthy. They kept a family suite in the Grosvenor House Hotel in London and sent their children to be educated in England. They already had in place, arrangements to bribe the Majlis; pay mob leaders to counter the spontaneous demonstrations of support enjoyed by Mussadeq;

They had helped Woodhouse of MI6 before and they were given £1.5 million pounds to use for bribery in the country now. A cache of arms had been previously buried somewhere in Iran and was now made available to the rabble rousers ready for the trouble to start.

Mussadeq knew the Rashidians were British agents but his faith in democracy meant allowing them to continue their plotting against him in freedom. When he discovered that something serious was really going on, he forced out their financers but the damage was already done. The British Voluntary Council, long a cover for intelligence operatives in Iran, were also removed from the country too late. 

President Dwight D Eisenhower came to office in November 1952 changing the American attitude towards the Iranian Prime Minister. He sympathised instead with the British desire to oust Mussadeq and take back control of the Iranian oil supplies.

Of course it is always necessary in a coup situation that the victim plays his part correctly and Mussadeq obliged. He awarded himself emergency powers to pass laws by decree and then set about reforming the country’s land laws and redistributing the oil wealth.

At the same time, Mussadeq dismissed many Civil Servants and army leaders. When the senate objected, he ordered the Majlis to close it down. When opposition found the courage to resist, Mussadeq held a referendum and won by an overwhelming majority. 
He antagonised the Islamist leaders with his modernization programme and his determination to enfranchise women. In his recent actions, he had departed from those who upheld constitutional values and, in his opposition to the colonialist agenda; he had upset those who became powerful and rich under their hand.

With the loss of his traditional supporters, Mussadeq found himself more aligned to the Communist Tudeh, the terrain of intelligent, forward thinking young Iranians, keen to be free from the shackles of imperial domination and the corruption of the Majlis. By failing to keep on side those who valued an easy life, he left himself vulnerable to his enemies.

In part 3 the story of the coup bears an uncanny resemblence to events right now in Syria.